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HJ THE SUPREllE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAII 
-------------------
----------------------
ELAINE DEVAULT, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-v-
ANTHONY MITCHELL, in his 
capacity as Director of 
the Utah Department of 
Social Services, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 15532 
This is an appeal from a decision of the District 
Court dismissing appellant's action wherein she sought to 
overturn a decision of the Utah Department of Social 
Services and its hearing examiner denying her application 
for General Assistance. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
The Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, the Honorable David B. Dee, Judge, denied 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granted 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, thereby upholding the 
determination of the Department of Social Services and 
its hearing examiner. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT OU APPEAL 
Respondent urges this Court to affirm the decision 
of the Third Judicial District Court in finding that 
appellant was not entitled to receive General Assistance 
under the regulations of the Department of Social 
Services. 
STATEHElJT OF FACTS 
Appellant has stated that she accepts the facts as 
found by tl:: i'f.'.: ~ j e:-:aminer. Those facts are summarizec 
as follows: 
1. Appellant is residing with her daughter, her 
ex-husband, and a friend of the family. 
2. All members of the family are residing in the 
same household, all indirectly related except the one 
frien3 and her children. 
3. The combined household consists of nine people. 
4. Appellant applied for General Assistance on 
February 9, 1977. A hearing was held on March 15, 1977, 
and the application was denied. 
According to appellant's complaint, she has been 
living with her daughter, grandchildren and ex-husband 
since February, 1977. Although appellant contends that 
she contributed some money to her daughter when she first 
moved in, she had made no norc payments or contributions, 
-2-
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and she continues to reside in the household and eat 
her ~eals with the family. 
Based upon these facts, the hearing examiner 
concluded that appellant was not a separate econo~ic 
unit, and her application for General Assistance was 
denied. 
ARGUHENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT'S DETERMINATION THAT 
APPELLANT 1'/AS NOT ELIGIBLE FOR GENERAL 
ASSISTANCE vvAS CONSISTENT \VITH UTAH 
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS AND l'lAS 
SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AS FOUND BY 
THE HEARING EXA!-1INER. 
A. APPELLANT WAS NOT A SEPARATE 
ECONOMIC UNIT AS DEFINED BY 
DEPARnlENT REGULATIONS. 
In order to qualify individually for General Assistance, 
a person must be a separate "economic unit", which is 
defined in Department of Social Services regulations as: 
"One or more persons living together 
in common quarters, purchasing and 
preparing food together, with he 
income of each individual being 
available to the entire group for 
their support, care and maintenance." 
(Vol. II, Assistance Payments 
Administration Manual) . 
wnen the elements of this definition are considered 
separately it is clear that appellant was not a separate 
-3-
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economic unit, but rather was a memb0r of the economic 
unit consisting of herself and other members of her 
family who were all living together. The corr.ponents 
of this regulation are: 
a. "One or more persons living together in col'U1\on 
quarters." There is no dispute that appellant was 
living in common quarters with her daughter and ex-
husband. There is no indication that the house was 
dividec' ·;_, -:~ :;, --~_at<e apartments. The members of the 
household all shared the same quarters, as would any 
other family group. 
b. "Purchasing and preparing food together." 
Appellant emphasizes that the hearing examiner did not 
specifically find that the appellant and other members 
of the household purchased and prepared food together. 
There does not seem to be any evidence as to which 
persons actually did do the grocery shopping and cooking, 
or that any one person performed these tasks all the 
time. However, it is clear that the group did eat their 
meals together. Appellant was not expected to purchase, 
store and prepare her own food, nor was this her actual 
practice. She lived and ate as a member of the larger 
household group, not as a single economic unit. 
-4-
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c. "The incoQe of each individual being available 
to the entire group for their support, care and main-
tenance." Although appellant had no individual income 
to contribute to the rest of the household, it is evident 
from the circumstances described in the hearing examiner's 
report that the incomes of other family or household 
members were available for appellant's living needs. 
Appellant was living in the home and eating meals. 
It is obvious that other members of the household were 
providing for her needs. It is common knowledge that 
every person in every household does not contribute an 
income to the group. For example, a woman who is not 
employed outside of the home often does not contribute 
an income. She does, however, live in the house along 
with Other members of the family, she eats meals with 
theQ, and others bring in the income which provides for 
her needs. It could not be argued that such a woman 
was a separate economic unit; she is one of the group 
who together are an economic unit. Similarly, the 
appellant is a member of a household group who share 
common living quarters as well as meals. She is not 
a separate economic unit. 
The Department regulation found in Vol. II, 
Assistance Payments Manual §262.3 provides that a 
-5-
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"General AssistancE: household" is: 
"Any adults and emancipated persons 
living toJcthcr in cun."non quarters 
(except roo~ers, boarders and live-in 
attendants) shall be considered as a 
househould provided they live as an 
economic unit." 
As has been seen, appellant was, in fact, living 
with other adults in common quarters anC: they lived as 
an economic unit. She could not, therefore, be considere: 
as a sepO>rc;":c -~, __ :ere::!. Assistance household, and her 
application was properly denied. 
Appellant's arglli~ent that the fair hearing decision 
was not supported by the evidence at that hearing fails 
because the mere fact that she could show boarder status 
at one point did not make her a separate economic unit 
under the applicable regulation. Taking all the facts 
and circumstances of appellant's unique situation to-
gether the fair hearing officer was justified in con-
eluding that the other members of the household \-:ere 
helping to support the appellant by the mere fact of 
having her in the home. 
B. DENIAL OF APPELLAtJT'S APPLICATION 
I•IAS COUSISTEUT l-l!TH THE PURPOSE 
OF UTAH'S PUBLIC ASSISTANCE STATUTE. 
Section 55-15a-l, Utah Code Annotated, states: 
"It is the purpose of this act to provide 
assistance to any person in Utah in need. 
-6-
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A person is in need and entitled to assist-
ance if sufficient resources are not avail-
able for his use within the limitations 
set forth herein and who otherwise qualifies." 
The State of Utah provides public assistance for the 
purpose of aiding those who are truly needy. Public 
assistance funds are not unlimited, and the Department 
of Social Services must restrict payment of these funds 
to persons who are actually in need. The General Assistance 
Program, which appellant applied for, is funded entirely 
by the State, and there are no federal matching funds 
available. It is important, therefore, that General 
Assistance funds be used only for the purposes stated 
by the legislature. As U.C.A. §55-15a-l, supra, states, 
a person is in need if sufficient resources are not 
available for his use. In determining eligibility for 
assistance, the Department must consider resources which 
are actually available to an applicant. In the present 
case, resources of other family members are, in fact, 
being made available to plaintiff. The Department must 
look at the facts as they exist at the time a person 
applies for assistance, and if those facts show that 
sufficient resources are available tothe applicant, 
then she is ineligible for assistance and her application 
rms t be denied. 
-7-
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The State does not have the responsibility to give 
public assistance to every person who, as an individual, 
is poor. As is stated in 79 Am Jur2d, Welfare Laws §55: 
"Something more than absolute poverty is 
essential to charge the state with the duty 
to support. A person may be ever so destitute 
of estate or ability to earn a livelihood, and 
yet not be a pauper. For instance, he may be 
cared for by the voluntary action of fri0nds 
or relatives, or the duty to care for him may 
by law be cast on relatives, for it has been 
held that persons having relatives able to 
support, them and willing or legally liable 
to do so, cannot be treated as paupers." 
Appella~~ a~~-as that she would not have to depend 
on her family, a~d could establish herself as an economic 
unit, if she received a General Assistance grant. HoHeve: 
it is not the purpose of public assistance to provide 
someone with the means to become a separate economic unit. 
There may be many people living in a house with other 
members of a familv who would prefer to be able to live 
separately. But it is not the state's business to provi~ 
every such person with the means to gain independence. 
To approve appellant's application for assistance 
would defeat the purpose of the public assistance statute, 
which is to provide aid for the truly needy. The limited 
funds which are available for General Assistance cannot 
justifiably be expended for aid to someone in appellant's 
present circumstances. 
-8-
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POINT II 
RESPONDENT DETERMINED APPELLANT'S 
ELIGIBILITY CORRECTLY AS TO TIME. 
Appellant raises an issue not considered below to 
the effect that her eligibility was evaluated as of the 
time of the hearing rather than as of thetimeof the 
application. This issue cannot be properly raised on 
appeal of course, but even so the hearing examiner 
was acting within his discretion to find that a one-
time payment of room and board prior to application did 
not materially affect appellant's status as part of a 
larger economic unit. Even if appellant were correct 
on this point and could properly raise it now, she would 
only be deemed eligible for a one time grant. 
POINT III 
THERE WAS NO DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS Ill 
RESPONDENT'S DETERMINATION THAT APPELLANT 
HAS INELIGIBLE FOR GENERAL ASSISTANCE. 
Appellant claims that respondent created an irrebuttable 
presumption that appellant's relatives provided her with 
support and maintenance merely because of their familial 
relationship. No such presumption was in fact created, 
nor was such a presumption necessary to respondent's 
determination. The Department of Social Services did not 
-9-
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presume that her relatives' resources would be avail,ble 
to appellant, the facts showed that the resources actually 
were available because appellant actually was being 
sheltered by her family members. Admittedly a 
determination of eligibility for public assistance must 
be based on income and resources that are actually 
available for the support and maintenance of the applica~. 
Lewis v. Martin, 398 U.S. 555 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 
u.s. 309 (l%2'. ~'- Lewis v. Hartin, supra, the Supreme 
Court considered the question whether or not the income 
of a "man in-the-house", or a stepfather with no legal 
duty of support, could be considered in determining 
eligibility for AFDC. It was held that because there 
was no legal duty of support, the income of such persons 
could not be presumed available for the support of the 
children, but if the income was actually available, it 
could be considered in determining eligibility. The 
same concept applies in the present case. Appellant's 
daughter and ex-husband apparently had no legally 
enforceable duty to provide for her support and main-
tenance, and it cannot be presumed that they would offer 
support. Nevertheless, the facts show that the other 
family members~ providing for appellant's support, 
their resources were actually available to her. Therefore, 
-10-
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appellant was not eligible for General Assistance, 
and her application was properly denied. 
POINT IV 
DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S APPLICATION WAS 
NOT A VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION. 
No artificial or arbitrary classification was made 
by the Department of Social Services in considering 
appellant's application for General Assistance. Appellant's 
individual circumstances were the only criteria used in 
determining that she was ineligible. Appellant claims 
that General Assistance applicants are divided into two 
classes: ( 1) those who are otherwise· eligible for 
General Assistance, are financially able to maintain a 
separate residence, and are not denied General Assistance; 
and (2) those who are otherwise eligible for General 
Assistance, but are not financially able to maintain a 
separate residence, and are denied General Assistance. 
Appellant was not denied General Assistance because 
she was unable to maintain a separate residence, but 
rather because her circumstances at the time of the 
application indicated that there were sufficient resources 
available for her support and maintenance. She was not 
"otherwise eligible" for General Assistance, and so she 
-11-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
did not fit into the class des~ribe8 even if such a 
classification existed. 
The United States Supre~e C0urt has ofte~ saic, 
"The Constitution does not provi~e judicial re~edies 
for every social and ec0nomic ill' . Lincsev v. l:orT>.et, 
405 u.s. 56, 74 (1972), and San Antonio School District 
v. Rodriauez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973). Furtherr.::>re, ir. 
Dandridge v. \·:illia-·s, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), the Sup~e::1e 
Court held tta~ ~ ~r~=~ welfare regulation which lioited 
the anount of ar. _:_:occ grant regardless of fanily size 
did not violate t~e equal protection clause. The Court 
said: 
"[T]he intractable econonic, social, 
and ever. philosophical proble~s pr~sented 
by public Helfare assistance prograrr.s are 
not the business of this Court. ~he 
Constitution nay inpose certain procedural 
safeguc:.~ds upo:1 systems of \·.'elfare adrnj r:-
istration, [citations ooitted]. But the 
Constitution does not empower this Court 
to second-guess state officials charged 
with the difficult responsibility of 
allocating limited public welfare funds 
among the oyriad of potential recipients." 
397 U.S. at 488. 
Every denial of an application for public assistance 
does ~ot create constitutional proble~s. Sc2ee sta;,dards 
and regulations must be established to insure that only 
those who are genuinely in need are gra~ted assista~ce. 
In the present case, appellant simply did not meet 
-12-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
eligibility requirements; she was provided with food 
and shelter and was not in need according to Utah 
statutes and regulations. Hence, her application was 
denied, and that denial simply does not raise a con-
stitutional question. 
POINT V 
APPELLANT'S APPLICATION HAS NOT DENIED 
DUE TO HER FANILIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH 
OTHERS IN THE HOUSEHOLD. 
Despite appellant's protestations to the contrary, 
her familial relationship with other members of the 
household was not determinative in the denial of her 
application for assistance. As appellant states on 
page 8 of her Brief, the primary question to be asked 
in connection with an application is, "Is the applicant 
needy?" In answering that question in this particular 
case, the Department had to consider the following facts: 
(1) appellant was being supplied with shelter; (2) 
appellant was being supplied with food; (3) no specific 
arrangements for payment for these services had been 
made; and (4) no demand for payment had been made nor 
had a time limit been established after which the services 
would be discontinued. Upon these facts, the answer to 
the question is clearly that the appellant, at the time 
she applied for assistance, was not needy. 
-13-
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The only sig~ificance o£ the familial relationship 
in this case was that it typified the situation. As 
in many other families, all meniliers do not contribute 
an equal share toward the living expenses of the house-
hold. A good example is the twenty-four year old son 
who lives with his parents, is unemployed, and contributes 
nothing toward his room and board. Nonetheless, his 
parents :or~··ic. li. ,.,ith food, shelter, even clothing, 
althougn tney are not legally bound to do so. Such a 
person could not be considered needy for purposes of 
public assistance eligibility. Likewise, the appellant 
was not needy when she applied for assistance. lvhether 
or not her relatives had a legal duty to provide her 
support, the facts shm.; that they were doing so. Their 
familial relationship may have prompted appellant's 
daughter and former husband to provide support, but if 
they were unrelatec and the same situation existed, the 
applicant would still have been denied. 
The facts show that the people with whom appellant 
was living were able and willing to support her. That 
she was related to those persons makes the situation 
more understandable, but was not the determinative 
factor in the Department's denial of her application 
for public assistance. 
-14-
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CONCLUSIO;-J 
There has been no showing that the lower court 
errec in it's determination of law in this case. The 
facts support the decision made by the hearing examiner 
for the Department of Social Services, and the lower 
court correctly upheld that decision. Appellant's 
application for General Assistance was denied because 
she did not live as a separate economic unit, but 
rather was a member of a larger household where she 
was provided with support and maintenance. This 
denial was consistent with state statutes and regulations, 
and also with the Utah and United States ConstitutionE. 
For the foregoing reasons, the ruling of the 
lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT 13. HAHSEN 
Attorney General 
PAUL M. TI!JKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
-15-
d 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
HAILING CEPTIFICATI: 
This is to certify that I mailed two copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent, postage prepaid, to 
Lucy Billings and Michael Shepard, Attorneys for Appellant, 
Utah Legal Services, 352 South Denver Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 84111, on this the 7th day of March, 1978. 
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